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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we introduce a framework that is an extension of
the capability approach of Amartya Sen to analyse the concept of
disability in a dynamic context for the disabled person. We build
a theory of “dis-capability”, according to which we deﬁne as dis-
abled someonewhohas a limited capability set compared tohis/her
objectives, ambitions and systemof values. The aim is to explain the
dynamics between expectation, adaptation and creative adaptation
for a dis-capabled person. In this perspective, disability repre-
sents the interweave between two pathways. While the ﬁrst one,
generating a condition of personal vulnerability, limits one’s capa-
bility set, the second one is a pathway of creative adaptation, able
to disclose new abilities, opportunities and potentialities. Exter-
nal capabilities emerge within such pathways. These capabilities,
which rest on a close relationship between two or more individu-
als, signiﬁcantly contribute to the construction of new capabilities.
Finally, we examine some of the conditions under which external
capabilities change from the direct interaction between few people
to wider collective or team agency actions.
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r é s u m é
Dans cet article, le cadre d’analyse que nous proposons est une
extension de la théorie des capabilités d’Amartya Sen permet-
tant de reconsidérer le concept de handicap dans un contexte
dynamique. Nous construisons une théorie de la «dis-capabilité »
selon laquelle est considérée comme handicapée la personne qui
dispose d’un ensemble limité de capabilités au regard des objec-
tifs qu’elle s’est ﬁxés, de ses ambitions et de son système de
valeur. L’objectif de cet article vise à expliquer les dynamiques
à l’œuvre entre les attentes, les adaptations et les changements
créatifs d’une personne «dis-capable ». Dans cette perspective,
le handicap représente l’entrelacement de deux cheminements.
Le premier engendre une situation de vulnérabilité individu-
elle, réduit l’ensemble de capabilités disponibles, tandis que le
second est un itinéraire d’adaptation créative, capable de révéler
de nouvelles capacités, opportunités et potentialités. De ces deux
trajectoires émergent des capabilités externes. Fondées sur une
relation de proximité entre deux ou plusieurs individus, ces capa-
bilités externes contribuent signiﬁcativement à la construction de
nouvelles capabilités. Enﬁn, nous examinons quelques unes des
conditions en vertu desquelles les capabilités externes évoluent de
l’interaction directe entre quelques individus à des actions collec-
tives ou fondées sur des capacités d’action de groupes plus larges.
© 2011 Association ALTER. Publié par Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous
droits réservés.
Introduction
According to Amartya Sen’s capability approach (1999), a person’s well-being is deﬁned not only
by the achievement of relevant functionings, namely his/her “beings and doings”, but also by the set
of functionings which potentially could be put into action. The latter aspect represents the capability
space, or real freedoms, fromwhich thepersonchooses the functioningamong thevariouspossibilities.
Both capabilities and functionings depend on the person’s characteristics in terms of commodities and
resources, as well as on how the conversion of these resources into actual functionings takes place
(Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000).
The concept of disability acquires its relevancewhenwe take into consideration the second aspect:
all other things being equal, a person who has a reduced ability to convert resources into functionings
achieves a lower level of well-being. Sen (2004) argues that the concept of disability has been almost
completely neglected by the major social justice theories, which in turn has justiﬁed the lack of polit-
ical intervention in this ﬁeld (Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 2009). Furthermore, Sen (1994) points out that
a disabled person has speciﬁc needs and, as a consequence, he/she requires additional resources in
order to avoid a life of poverty. He also observes that such disparities in personal characteristics and
circumstances do notmerely represent exceptional cases but arewidespread (Burchardt, 2004). Inter-
personal differences refer to disparities both in personal circumstances (i.e. gender, age or proneness
to illnesses) as well as in social factors, such as the surrounding epidemiologic environment and other
environmental determinants, which directly or indirectly can inﬂuence the conversion of personal
resources into the freedom to leading lives without unacceptable deprivations. Sen clearly states one
of the guiding principles of our analysis: diversity is an intrinsic characteristic of human being (Terzi,
2005).
Approaching disability through Sen’s framework has several advantages as described in the previ-
ous article in this issue Trani et al., (Bayles, 2002;Mitra, 2006;Welch, 2007). However, in the literature,
themost problematic aspect of the capability approach is the difﬁculty ofmaking operational twoof its
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core aspects: self-determination and self-evaluation. This aspect, widely utilised within the approach,
remains vague and unclear.
In this paper, we attempt to propose a deﬁnition of disability that uses Sen’s categories to build a
framework of dis-capability1 that encompasses some crucial aspects that remain unexpanded in Sen’s
approach.
The aim of this “enhanced capability framework” is to explain the dynamics between expectation,
adaptation and creative adaptation for a “dis-capabled” person. In other words, we will deﬁne and
argue that apersoncanbe considereddisabled if he/shehas a limited capability set compared tohis/her
objectives, ambitions and system of values. In this perspective, disability represents the interweave
between two pathways. While the ﬁrst one, generating a condition of personal vulnerability, limits
one’s capability set, the second one is a pathway of creative adaptation, able to disclose new abilities,
opportunities and potentialities.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we explore the concept of dis-capability and we present a framework
based on an extension of the capability approach of Amartya Sen to analyse the concept of disability
in a dynamic context.
In the second part of the paper, external capabilities, which emerge within the previous pathways,
are considered. These capabilities, which rest on a close relationship between two or more individ-
uals, signiﬁcantly contribute to the construction of new capabilities. Then, we examine some of the
conditions under which external capabilities change from the direct interaction between few people
to wider collective or team-agency actions.
In the last section of the paper, the main conclusions are given.
Disability as “dis-capability”
It seems methodologically convenient to start with a provisional and minimal deﬁnition of the
phenomenon considered.2 It must be used only has a “connotative point of departure” from which we
can develop a critical reﬂection. As a ﬁrst step, we accept the following deﬁnition: “Disability is often
deﬁned as a physical,mental, sensory, or psychological condition that limits a person’s activities”(SDD,
2007, 4–5). Although the term “condition” can project a static reality, we would prefer the term “pro-
cess”, this deﬁnition presents the advantage of stressing the aspects of “limit” and “activity”. Nothing is
speciﬁed about the nature of the limit: at this stage of our analysis, we assume that these limits can be
biological or socio-institutional, strictly personal or over-individual, temporary or permanent.3 Fur-
thermore, nothing is speciﬁedabout theactivities: are theypersonal or social?Rational orbehavioural?
Intentional or devoid of any goal? Reactive or proactive? Circumscribed or systemic? We will deﬁne
these distinctions in following sections.
In order to move towards a more appropriate deﬁnition of disability, the ﬁrst theoretical step we
propose implies the refusal of the “concepts of class”. They ﬁt one into each other as the Chinese
boxes: two classes whatever, one of which includes the other entirely and even more, can be deﬁned
genus and species. This is the case, for instance, of the classes ‘Animal’ and ‘Human Being’, or ‘Human
Being’ and ‘Mathematician’ (Mill, 1843). In her most recent works on disability, without expressing
any explicit criticism, Nussbaum (2006) deﬁnes her viewon a conceptualisation based on the notion of
class. In fact, the philosopher notes that in the literature pertaining to disability, impairment is viewed
as a loss of the normal body functions; disability is the impossibility to do something within one’s
everyday environment; handicap is the consequent disadvantage at a competitive level. Furthermore,
Nussbaum points out how difﬁcult it is to draw a line between impairment and disability, especially
when the social context is not taken for granted but is ﬂuctuant. She concludes observing that, since
1 Please note that we propose the term “dis-capability”, not to forge the umpteenth neologism, but in reference to the term
dis-ability. The preﬁx “dis” does not deny the individual’s abilities or capabilities; it rather expresses their inadequacy as in
regard to the subject’s self-representation.
2 For an extensive dissertation on the debate concerning deﬁnitions of disability, taxonomy and applications of both, see
Altman (2001).
3 Consequently, differently from the meaning it has in the ICF model of disability, limit has to be considered as a bond, not as
a limitation.






Fig. 1. Concepts of health, impairment, disability and handicap.
Authors’ elaboration.
it is not possible to prevent all disabilities, as impairments will continue to limit people’s functioning
even in a fair social environment.4 Consequently, efforts need tobemade towardspreventinghandicap
as far as basic rights are concerned. As shown in Fig. 1, we have a wider set representing the normal
condition of health; within it, we can distinguish a main subset of impairments; next, a part of such
subset depicts disabilities; ﬁnally, a further subset of disability becomes handicap. In the medical
ﬁeld, we can ﬁnd a similar categorization based on class: we move from health to the condition
of disease (the biological and strictly physical base of a pathology), to illness (the social value), to
sickness (the relational disadvantage). The weak point of this procedure consists in the idea that it
is possible to represent a wide set, within which it is then possible to identify progressively smaller
and more demanding subsets. Making the analogy with Stuart Mill quoted above, it is the idea that
a mathematician is just a kind of human being and that a human being is nothing else but a kind of
animal. However,what if each animal is, to a certain extent, both a humanbeing and amathematician?
What if someone who does not have any impairment can also be called disabled? What if a “healthy”
person suffers from limitations of certain activities, which are not the consequence of impairment? In
other words, what happens if we are no longer allowed to consider the impairment as the watershed
between health/normality and disability/abnormality?
The concept of class is not compatible with the idea of disability we want to put forward. We think
it is more adequate to comprehend disability through concepts, which are sets with partial and plural
intersections. This manner of reasoning was put forward in the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953,
46–47, authors’ translation): «Consider, for instance, those processes that we call “games”. I mean
board games, card games, ball games, contests and so forth. What do they have in common? [. . .] If
you observe them, certainly you will not see anything common to all of them. Still, you will see a
wide range of similarities and afﬁnities. [. . .] Observe, for instance, board games, with their several
4 We are here reﬂecting about the author’s most recent opinions about disability. In her previous works, Nussbaum (2000)
had stated that the absence of central capability could lead to deﬁne the person as “not human”, being devoid of the aristotelic
rationality. In thenewversionof her approach, developed in the TheNewFrontiers of Justice, Nussbaum(2006) still acknowledges
that some people with very severe impairments, as those in a permanent vegetative state, who are not able to think, perceive,
feel might be deﬁned as “not human”. It is the lack of not just one, but of a set of relevant capabilities that can induce us to deny
that a subject is a human being.














Fig. 2. Common features and “similarities”.
Boudon (1990)
analogies. Now consider card games: you will ﬁnd a lot of similarities with those belonging to the ﬁrst
class, but several common features have disappeared and others have taken over. If nowwe look at ball
games, something has been preserved, but has been lost. [. . .] Likewise, we can review several other
groups of games and see similarities, which emerge and disappear. The outcome of such a review
appears like a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and intersecting. These similarities
are evident on a large scale and on a small scale ». Fig. 2 illustrates how Raymond Boudon (1990, p.
335, our translation) has deepened Wittgenstein’s argument: « Each of the circles, which make up this
diagram, contains a subset of games with a common feature (for example the one of being a game of
chance) and, therefore, presenting a “similarity” or a “familiar feel”. Of course, these circles intersect in
an imperfect way: no game of chance is played alone; only some of them are card games and so forth.
First of all, as Wittgenstein argued, from this ﬁgure it emerges that if we consider the set of games,
there is nothing that is common to all of them. There are also pairs of games, for instance G1 and G8,
which do not own any common feature. Finally, generally speaking, the relation of “resemblance” is
not transitive. It owns such prerogative within the same circle: there is a “resemblance” or a “familiar
feel” between the types G1 and G2, G2 and G3, G1 and G3. However, it loses this property as soon as
we pass from one circle to the other: there is a resemblance among G1 and G2, G2 and G4, but not
between G1 and G4. Likewise, there is a resemblance between G1 and G3, G3 and G6, G6 and G8, G8
and G9, but not, for example, between G1 and G6, G1 and G8, or G6 and G9».
Similarly,wecan imagine that ourgamesare themembersof society, bothwithandwithout impair-
ment.Moving fromone individual to another, there are common characteristics,which become salient
or latent. Following this logic, what would be the utility of aggregating people with physical problems
and people with mental problems into one category? Is it useful to distinguish between impaired and
non-impaired people if the nature of each impairment can be so different that no common feature
prevails between two individuals? Since it is easier to identify not-transitive similarities than com-
mon characteristics between different kinds of impairments, we argue that it is absolutely pointless
to search for a unique “container” that would hold all of them.
In their critical review of the social model of disability, Shakespeare and Watson (2002, p. 24, 26)
clearly address this crucial point: « Impairment and disability are not dichotomous, but describe dif-
ferent places on a continuum, or different aspects of a single experience. It is difﬁcult to determine
where impairment ends and disability starts, but such vagueness needs not be debilitating. [. . .] No
one’s body works perfectly, or consistently, or eternally. We are all in some way impaired. [. . .] These
central truths are obscured within the Western tradition of mind/body dualism: since the Enlighten-
ment, humans have been deﬁned in terms of their rational capacities, that is, what separates us from
animals, rather than the physical nature which connects to animals ».
Evidently, this perspective enables us to go beyond the view of considering a typical characteristic
that would encompass all deﬁnitions of disability, namely the need to refer to an assumed “normality”
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according to which it would be possible to state that the individual x suffers from a limitation and,
thus, he/she can be deﬁned as a person with disabilities. We intend to diverge from this approach
(Terzi, 2005). By contrast, in line with the views of Gardner (1999), a scholar who put forward the idea
that there are several types of intelligence, we would prefer to consider “normality” as a plurality of
differences. Gardner (1999) observes that each and every one of us possesses a whole range of the
various types of intelligence. Itmay be highly improbable that twopeople have exactly the same types,
to the same degree and in a similar combination, not even identical twins.Moreover, the conﬁguration
of these types of intelligence and their interrelations change and evolve with the time as a result
of the events people experience and consequently of the meaning they attribute (or not) to such
events. According to this view, since normality ceases to exist, a comparison with the latter becomes
meaningless. Amundson (2000) adequately demonstrates how biology does not make a distinction
between normal and abnormal functions. In fact, the very idea of “normal functions” represents at
best an instrument made by some scientists, similar to the one made in the past with the concept of
race. Consequently, the conception of disability as a category containing all people who do not show
“normal” functions loses its validity.
Shakespeare and Watson’s argument, (2002) that we are all impaired to a certain extent, does
have one essential quality: it considers disability to be one of the conditions of normality instead of
treating it as an anomaly. However, it looks at human beings through a criterion which evaluates the
functionality of a certain organ. Therefore, it tends to characterize the person through an “objective”
parameter (the level of malfunctioning).
With regards to our discussion, about two centuries ago, in Italy, Leopardi (1827, 1834) expressed a
philosophicallymore adequate point of view. As one of themain scholars of the poet, Timpanaro (1970,
p. 42, our translation) noted that according to Leopardi « we cannot imagine a future inwhich suffering
caused by the contrast between some human beings’ biological limits and his/her aspirations (in the
ﬁnal analysis hedonistic, but very complicated and enriched by culture) can be radically overcome.
Of course, the number of illnesses will be healed, the average length of human life will be prolonged
and human beings will have use of technical tools, able to enhance their power in several ﬁelds [. . .].
Still, they will always represent reformist but not revolutionary progress. Unless we admit science
ﬁctional hypotheses, it will not be possible to really overcome human being’s biological fragility ». In
line with certain subsequent reﬂections of existentialism and phenomenology, Leopardi’s perspective
emphasiseshowvulnerability represents ageneralhumancondition. Leopardi’s strictmaterialismsees
thehumanbodynotasaperson’s vehicle, butas the incorporatedperson.Nonetheless, if theconscience
is not separated from the body, sickness or disability cannot be understood as mere pathological
processes, since in human life nothing is only biological. Sickness or disabilities are holistic forms in
which ourweaknessmanifests itself. They do not originate solely from the reduction of a physiological
function. On the contrary, they regard the whole person in his/her corporeity and sociability. Sickness
is mainly perceived as a disturbance of the relations between the “sick” person and the surrounding
world, rather than as a biological disorder (Toombs, 1988). Thus, alongside the (medical) treatment of
the biological ill functioning, we need a different kind of cure that could be deﬁned as “interpersonal”,
aimed at reducing the impact of sickness or disability on the person’s life (Carel, 2007, p. 98). Leopardi
observed that if human beings come to life, grow up and die in vulnerable conditions, we must not
deceive them. We can only comfort them, that is, take care of them. This conceptual shift summarized
by Lindsey’s expression (1996) from cure to care, is radical andwill represent one of themost important
milestones in coming essays on this issue.5
The analysis we have developed so far leads us to argue that it is necessary to build an appropri-
ate deﬁnition of “disability”, taking into consideration the fact that it is not a phenomenon that can
be somehow reduced to dimensions of homogeneity and unity. By contrast, it represents a partial
intersection of different but related sets. The appealing character of this perspective is evident. This
theoretical premise allows us to consider individuals and their possible ﬂourishing, instead of putting
them into aggregated categories.
5 While curing is meant to heal a person, caring implies a mutual exchange, based on human relationships. For an extensive
dissertation on the issue see Downie and Telfer (1980).
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Furthermore, adopting Leopardi’s view about the inherent vulnerability of human condition, we
admit the necessity of moving from the relation of medical cure to the one of interpersonal care.
The challenge we face consists in ensuring that our analytical approach does not become a mere
exercise of recording every single occurrence. How can we seriously take into consideration Wittgen-
stein’s position on sets with partial and plural intersections, and focus on individuals, and at the same
time, preserve a cohesive and coherent framework? In our opinion, the capability approach provides
the premise to enable to achieve this goal.
According to the approach, we consider as disabled any individual who–given his/her personal
characteristics and the relations with his/her surrounding world– is not able to do/be what he/she
aspires to do, be and become. In this sense, we deﬁne as disabled someone who has a limited capability
set compared to his/her objectives, ambitions and system of values.6 Here, we would like to return and
further specify the minimal deﬁnition introduced at the beginning of our paper, making it clear that
the limitation experienced by the disabled person must be assessed in a subjective way. The lack of
an objective/external evaluation regarding the existence of a given disability makes the search for a
unique cause of the disability superﬂuous. As a result, the age-old opposition between the social and
medical theories is naturally outdone (Terzi, 2005).
In other words, we are “not focusing” on establishing in an unambiguous way whether disabil-
ity – and the limitations of a person’s actions– are caused by the conditions of the society he/she lives
in, or if it is determined by his/her personal characteristics, i.e. his/her health conditions. This does not
mean that we are not interested in establishing what the cause of the disability is; rather, it means
that each situation requires speciﬁc evaluation (for the life project see Biggeri et al., this issue).
Going back to Leopardi, since human condition is inherently vulnerable and only mutual care
relations between frail individuals are able to steadily improve the quality of life and death, grief is
a central experience in any person’s life. Sooner or later, to some degree, all human beings have to
wonder what meaning they are able to confer to an existence marked by mourning, sickness and
disability. What is the life experience of a person who is no longer able to walk, or speak, or carry
out tasks such as writing or cooking? What is the impact of the illness on the person’s interactions
with the environment and with others? What becomes of our goals, plans and perspectives in the face
of medical uncertainty? What is the nature of the relation with our body and how does this relation
change when our body betrays us (Carel, 2007)? A long-term illness, or a permanent disability, forces
a re-orientation of our world: our subjective boundaries shrink in terms of agency and empowerment.
However it does not necessarily mean that the life we managed to build, worsens. Actually there are
different conceptions of well-being and well-becoming, and these evolve along with one’s age and
life experiences. Between the “biological body”, which gets weaker, and the “perceived body”, space
of ability, opportunity and potentiality emerge. Sickness or disability induces or can promote a range
of creative adaptations. In other words, they could become the stimuli for reactions able to alter the
content and the boundaries of one’s world. Indeed, in his/her continuous attempt at reducing his/her
limits and, if possible, at transforming them into resources, the person could develop competencies,
identify opportunities, foster a planning capacity that he/she would not have otherwise pursued.7 The
person who faces a condition of vulnerability, creates the resources that allow him/her to better adapt
to current conditions. He/she will thus act as a ﬁddler who does not know exactly what he/she is
going to produce, but who collects all he/she ﬁnds on his way, the strangest and most diverse things,
pieces of wood, pieces of string, old boxes: anything which could possibly provide usable material.
In short, he/she uses all the resources he/she has in hand to transform them into a useful object.
Most of the time, the objects he/she produces do not belong to a wider plan, but rather represent the
outcome of a sequence of contingent happenings, the fruit of all opportunities that have led him/her
to enrich his collection of knick-knacks. From an old bicycle wheel he/she builds a pulley, from a
broken chair, he/she obtains a box for a radio, cutting on one side, extending another one, exploiting
all opportunities in order to modify the old structures in view of the new functions (Jacob, 1977).
6 By the term “ambition”, we mean to indicate what one aspires to, what lets someone assert his/her personality.
7 It is fundamental to approach disability in terms of salutogenesis (namely in terms of positive adaptation and active reaction
to stress), instead of in terms of pathogenesis, Albrecht and Devlieger (1999).
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Fig. 3. The construction of a personal proﬁle according to the capability approach.
Authors’ adaptation from Shin (2005).
Similarly, a person who is affected by a severe form of vulnerability reacts adapting his/her organs,
attitudes and behaviours to functions that originally they did not carry out. Acting as a ﬁddler, he/she
manages to re-shape his/her agency and empowerment. Thus, the person sometimes succeeds in
drawing pathways of well-being and well-becoming not inferior to those he valued when he/she was
less vulnerable. All these considerations lead us to put forward the following deﬁnition: disability
represents the interweave between two pathways. While the ﬁrst one, generating a condition of personal
vulnerability, limits one’s capability set, the second one is a pathway of creative adaptation, able to disclose
new abilities, opportunities and potentialities.
Wewill now illustrate in intuitive terms themost important operative implication of our argument.
In simple terms, we can distinguish between two methodological approaches (Shin, 2005). Let’s take
into consideration three people: E1, E2 and E3. Obviously, they present both common and different
factors. The mainstream approach, within which we can place the evaluative protocols derived by
the ICF language, focuses on the creation of descriptive patterns, which highlight only the common
elements. In Fig. 3, the criterionC1 identiﬁes the “ring”, as the characteristic sharedby the threepeople,
the criterion C2 focus on “triangles”, while the C3 looks at “rectangles”. Since in terms of size, in E1
the ring is bigger than both triangles and rectangles, the C1 will be judged as the most appropriate
classiﬁcation for that speciﬁc person. For the same reason, C3 will be selected for E3, while for E2, C1
andC2will both be adequate. Thismodality of description/aggregation can be extended to the subjects
E4, E5 and so forth.
Policy recommendations based on such criteria of aggregation may be dangerous. For instance,
the person E1 does not merely consist of rings, although they prevail in size on other factors. An
intervention which, relying on C1, considers only rings, may be wrong-footed and even reversed
by the system of connections through which rings reproduce themselves. Consequences on the real
lives of people may be dramatic. Let us consider the example of Aimee Mullins. Her amputated legs
correspond to our “rings”. She is then placed next to the other “ring people”. However, Aimee got her
degree in a well- known university, she is a famous model, works as an actress and, thanks to adapted
prosthesis, is a good athlete (Garland-Thomas, 2002). What is more important, Aimee has managed
to creatively adapt her project of life in a way that allows her to increase well-being from aspects and
activities which are often not directly connected to the biomedical dimension and, more generally, to
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health. These aspects and activities make her “closer” or “more similar” not to the other “ring people”,
rather to a speciﬁc subgroup of people-with-legs.
Thecapability approachcriticizes this veryaspect: it dramatically changes theobject tobedescribed
and categorized, theorising about the role of a factor compared to the others, it considers each person
as a whole. Categorizing becomes an intellectual construction, which does not have the shape of a
ring, nor of a triangle, nor of any single factor. It represents an ideal type which, since the beginning,
tries to hold together the complexity of processes (Bellanca, 2004). What is overlooked in terms of
linearity and formal rigor is compensated in terms of explanatory capacity and of awareness of the
limits of social practices.
Dis-capability and interweave between adaptation and “exaptation”
In the ﬁeld of evolutionary biology, the pathway of creative adaptation is called “exaptation”. This
concept, aswell as its difference from the canonical one of “adaptation”, is essential in our analysis.We
deﬁne as “organization” an abstract conﬁguration of relations andprocesses,whilewedeﬁne as “struc-
ture” its concrete realization through speciﬁc entities. Thus, a system, a complex unit may change its
structurewithout losing its identity as longas theorganization ispreserved.8 When the systemwecon-
sider is a person, he/shemodiﬁes his/her own structure due to habitual events – the renewal of cellular
tissues – aswell as due to traumatic events – i.e. when a disability occurs. Nevertheless he/she remains
the same person since, despite the transformations taking place, his/her psycho/physical organization
remains unchanged. Franc¸ois Jacob, quoted above, speaks about tinkering when the components of a
structure change, altering its function, without changing the organization. As a simple mental exper-
iment, let us suppose we want to bake a cake. We know that its preparation requires some speciﬁc
tools and containers, an oven and some ingredients, in a given quantity. If we are not allowed to use
some tools or some ingredients, all the same we can bake our cake, working through the tinkering.
Thus we will look for those “accidental arrangements”, which might replace the missing components,
in order to get the “same” result. In otherwords, wewill try to change the structurewithoutmodifying
the organization. What usually happens is that the use of different tools, as well as the difference in
terms of quality between the original goal and the actual one, will change the function of the new
structure, the organization remaining the same.
When some of the ingredients of the original recipe cannot be used or obtained, the ﬁddler tries to
substitute them with those available. Yet, strictly speaking, in this way he/she alters both the means
and the ends. In the long term, he/shewill realize he/she is doing something different. Actually, his/her
ﬁrst objective (baking a cake “in a workmanlike fashion”) changes (relaxing, having fun, snacking with
friends, etc.. . .). These various operations of tinkering are deﬁned as “exaptation”: some attributes of
an organism, evolved to accomplish a speciﬁc adaptive function, or appeared by chance for a function
which cannot be identiﬁed, are co-opted for different goals. The concept of exaptation was introduced
by Gould and Vrba (1982), as well as by Gould (1991). Still nowadays, it is a controversial notion in the
debate between evolutionary biologists. For example, the black African heron uses itswings in order to
throw a circular shadow upon the low surrounding water. In doing so, it succeeds in attracting ﬁshes
towards a shade just below its beak. However, we know that thewings have evolved in order to ﬂy and
not to better capture ﬁshes. Another example is the human brain. Human beings manage to compose
and appreciate music, although the natural selection did not shape the brain to this end. In general,
we have exaptation when a structure changes its function, without modifying its organization.
On the other hand, the term adaptation comes from the Latin “ad-aptus” and means “towards a
speciﬁc adjustment”. It postulates that natural selection has evolutionary modulated each attribute to
a speciﬁc aimand that this attribute continues tomodify inorder tomore effectively carry out thegiven
function. Facing psychophysical impairments and/or socio-institutional limitations, a person is able
8 Wemeanbyorganization the set of relations that have to exist between themembers of an entity so that it can be considered
as belonging to a speciﬁc class. By structure we refer to the set of components and relations that, concretely, make up a speciﬁc
unit in its organization (Maturana and Varela, 1984).
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to reproduce thanks to adaptations and exaptations, so that the quality of his/her life is not affected.9
Fromourperspective, it represents the (necessarily) creative aspect of disability. Furthermore,weneed
to emphasize that the exercise of exaptation does not concern only the disabled person but also the
people close to him/her: his/her family, the local associations and his/her surrounding environment.
Towards the framework of “dis-capability”
At this stage,weneed to ask the theoretical question: howdoes the capability set change before and
after the process of adaptation that includes both canonical and creative adjustments, which deﬁne
exaptation?
In order to answer this question we need to rephrase the capability approach within a model that,
in view of our aims, is: (a) sufﬁciently detailed and unambiguous; (b) endowed with one or more
explanatory mechanisms. As far as the ﬁrst aspect (a) is considered, the term capability is very broad
and refers to a set of abilities and possibilities: this combination is essential and at the core of the
approach. However, in our analytical process, we must deconstruct it. As far as (b) is considered, while
a major section of existing literature tends to interpret the capability approach as solely a normative
framework (Robeyns, 2005, p. 94; Alkire, 2005, p. 125; Gasper, 2007, p. 356), we aim to translate it
into models that enable us to explain personal and social processes (Trani et al., this issue). What
we present in this paper is a simple model, which appears suitable to our main end and which, in
light of the concepts we will deﬁne in the following sections, we may call TAOPE (T-EnTitlements, A-
capability as Ability, O-capability as Opportunity, P-capability as Potentiality, E-capability as external
capability).10 Evidently, these keywords are due to Amartya Sen’s long-term reﬂection and have been
partially made explicit by Gasper (2002). However, it seems useful to re-deﬁne them here, without
any exegetical connection to Sen’s works. Therefore we do not claim any hermeneutical “ﬁdelity”.
We can distinguish between abilities and two aspects of possibility: opportunity and potential-
ity. We call “A-capabilities” (capabilities as abilities) the complex of innate talents and of acquired
competencies (skills); “O-capabilities” (capabilities as opportunities) the set of actual, accessible or
available chances for improving well-being; “P-capabilities” (capabilities as potentialities) the set of
the imagined, prospects or conceivable chances of improving well-being. Please note that the Sen’s
notion of capability encompasses the A-capability and the O-capability concepts. While O-capabilities
refer to concretely accessible options and expectations, P-capabilities concern alternatives which can
be considered admissible: beliefs, attitudes, institutional expectations thus represent a “constriction
of perspectives” in which what is acceptable has the same value as what is available.11
Finally, we call entitlements factors/processes of conversion of a certain quali-quantitative stock
of resources and rights into well-being.12 Therefore, they are related to the control and the inﬂuence
over resources (power de facto), as well as to the access to the institutions within which resources
and rights are achievable, available, usable and transferable (power de jure). Although the recent
literature about the capability approach has tended to neglect this point, in our view, the notion of
entitlement plays a key role in Sen’s approach. It evokes both sides of social power: on one side, the
formal power, concerning the way of accessing and using institutions and, on the other, the informal
power, pertaining to the control over speciﬁc means. In other words, it considers both the explicit
power, which allows us to place on other individuals the burdens of our decisions, and the implicit
power, which results in excluding certain options from the set within, represents the options open to
9 In ﬁrst approximation, our reasoning can be applied to people who have to adapt/exapt to a “new” disability. Nevertheless,
in second approximation, our interpretative framework can be extended to people who were born with a disability. In fact, the
degree and the quality of their creative adjustments might be assessed in two main ways. The ﬁrst one is based on over time
comparisons of the condition of the person, the second one on comparisons between a speciﬁc person and the most similar
group (as far as the variables considered as relevant are concerned) without disability.
10 The concept of E-capability is analyzed in section 5.
11 Here we are applying the approach at the individual level. Potential capabilities at aggregate level include the individual
P-capability (Trani et al., this issue).
12 By resources we mean the set of means a person has access to. In the economic language, they consist of productive inputs
and goods.
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Power de facto:
Control and influence on a flow 
and a quali-quantitative  
stock of resources  
and social rights 
Power de jure:
Access to institutions  
within which   
resources and rights are achievable, 
available, usable and transferable 
Conversion factors/processes 
of resources
and rights into individual  
well-being 
Entitlements A-capabilities(talents +) 
Fig. 4. Casual nexus between power and entitlements within the social context.
Authors’ elaboration.
other people. Yet, if entitlements include social power in all its complexity, we can acknowledge the
ﬁrst assumption of ourmodel.With reference to the relation between entitlements and A-capabilities,
we assume that power (de facto and de jure) on some resources and/or rights represents the main
lever through which a person is able to keep, improve and strengthen his/her initial talents and to
gain competencies, which develop these. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 4, we presume the existence
of a casual nexus between the power and the entitlements a subject is able to exercise in his/her social
context.
Our further assumptions– represented in Fig. 5 –bring back both O-capabilities and P-capabilities
to a unique explanatory mechanism, which, in more general and intuitive terms, states that a person
Fig. 5. Capabilities between adaptation and exaptation.
Authors’ elaboration.
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tends to keep or –when it is altered– to restore a dynamic balance between his/her own convictions
and his/her own actions (Bellanca, 2008). If, for any reason, a person has to act against his/her own
convictions, or has to believe something that is in contrast or contradiction with his/her actions, such
a misalignment causes discomfort (which is, at the same time, psychological, cognitive and value-
based). The required realignment will take place in four ways: his/her convictions will be shaped by
the action; the action will be shaped by his/her convictions; the tension between the two aspects
will transform itself into a creative positive outcome–what we have called “exaptation” –or into a
negative one. Finally, the model distinguishes three conﬁgurations that actions and ideal convictions
might take on. These forms, combined with the four types of realignment, constitute the twelve cases
summarised in Fig. 5.
First let us consider the case where we ﬁnd a misalignment between single behaviours and single
expectations. For instance, the single behaviour C shows that I, Andrew, walk for 1km. The single
expectation A indicates that tomorrow morning I’ll get up and I will take a walk for a kilometre up to
Betty’s house. However, the actual event, which takes place, is a frustrated expectation: the following
day I start my walk but I have to sit down after 500m because my legs cannot hold me up. I can
intervene on the remaining gap in four ways. First reaction: I decide that, before arriving at Betty’s
house, I had better read my newspaper sitting on the bench, convincing myself that this is a good way
to enjoy springtime. Thanks to this method, Andrew modiﬁes some of the elements of his expectation,
in order to reduce the gap with regards to the action carried out. Therefore, he alleges new cognitive
elements, which stress the negative aspects of the rejected option, or the positive ones of the chosen
alternative.13 In this case, A tries to adapt to C, namely C↓A. In the second reaction, I do not admit my
weakness and then refuse to sit down, maybe even reaching the point of physical exhaustion. In this
case, C↑A, that is C tries to adapt to A.My third reaction would entail admitting that it is difﬁcult for
me to walk long distances and I start using a bicycle, enjoying the experience and achieving my goal
of arriving at Carla’s house, situated further that Betty’s. In this case, we observe a creative adaptation
(exaptation) and we assume that C A.14 Finally: acknowledging that I am not able to walk for a long
time, I radically modify my behaviour, staying home. Also in this last case, as the subjects redeﬁne the
terms of the problem, we observe a creative adaptation, which is negative: C A.
The set of reactions (upward or downward adjustment and positive or negative exaptation) to
the gaps existing between single expectations and single behaviours represents the space of the O-
capabilities. Undeniably, an opportunity or a chance consists of moving deftly between expectations
and results, between what could/should happen and what we do/will do. In fact, new opportunities
would never rise if expectations and actions were fully aligned.
Secondly, we consider the case where there is misalignment between a belief and an attitude.
While an expectation concerns a punctual event, a belief refers to a system of expectations. The latter
indicates what is possible, shaping the horizon of the alternatives, which can be admitted as possible,
imagined or conceived. Similarly, while a given behaviour contains a single intentional act, an attitude
concerns our future system of actions, which we build upon speciﬁc criteria and rules. As a result, in
spiteof beingaccessible andconvenient, certainbehaviour is rejectedbecauseof the criteriademanded
by the attitude. In addition, some expectations are discarded in the name of one’s belief. For instance,
the belief Be is that I, Andrew, imagine myself as eternally young. The attitude At points out that I,
Andrew, am building and I will continue to build my current and future actions according to the belief
13 Obviously, we also have to consider the positive examples, in which there is an upward adjustment of the behaviour to
the expectation. For a person with disabilities this is represented by an expanding of the current opportunities. For instance,
it becomes possible to him/her to go to the cinema twice a month. It is not relevant to which extent this person will make the
most of such opportunities. Even if they are not translated into behaviours, they manage to (plausibly) rise his/her expectations,
to expand the horizon of his/her aspirations and then, to improve his/her well-being. The most reliable evidence based on
econometric analyses on longitudinal data suggests that when adaptation does occur, it takes a different form (i.e. raising
aspirations to reﬂect new possibilities) from the type commonly discussed in the capability and well-being literature (reducing
aspirations to reﬂect straitened circumstances) (Clark, 2007). The author is referring to a well-known debate about preferences
and values adaptation, for an extensive dissertation on the issue see Qizilbash (2006).
14 Here and in Fig. 5, the positive process of exaptation is identiﬁed by the symbol , in order to distinguish it from the
symbols ↑ and ↓, characterizing the (upwards or downwards) relations of adaptation between convictions and actions. The
negative exaptation is represented by the symbol .
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that I will be young forever. Some current events x, y,. . . z impact on the association of belief and
attitude. A priori, we are not able to establish upon which term of the pair they will have a stronger
impact. Andrew will give his personal interpretation in order to decide how to react. It depends on
Andrew’s interpretation whether he chooses to deny his belief, or alter his attitude. From a theoretical
point, some events create a gap between belief and attitude, causing a misalignment and, demanding
a re-adjustment. There are four kinds of possible intervention. Firstly, I decide that I would better
live my own age. In this case, At tries to adjust to Be, that is Be ↓ At. Secondly, I do not recognize my
weakness. Thus, I start using botulinum, I go to the gym and so forth. In this case, Be ↑ At, namely Be
tries to adjust to At. The third and fourth reactions include positive and negative creative adaptations
(exaptations): Be and At. The set of reactions (upward or downward adjustment and positive or
negative exaptation) to the gaps existing between a belief and an attitude represents the space of the
P-capabilities. The beliefs concern the extent of the options that can be imagined or conceived: it is
the misalignment between these beliefs and the system of our actions that feeds (or suppresses) our
potentialities.
Thirdly, the misalignment is between subjective and institutional expectations. An institution
mainly works through routine. Therefore, participants are able to roughly anticipate what will happen
as long as the surrounding conditions are stable. The latter represents the expectations Ei of the insti-
tution to which I, Andrew, belong. Andrew’s subjective expectations are “second order” Es, since they
are built on the institutional expectation Ei. As long as the institution works, Ei are stable and reliable.
Nonetheless, in a situation of crisis, daily practices may be interrupted.15 In such circumstances, the
existing gap between objective and subjective predictions widens. In turn, this stimulates one of the
mechanisms of reduction of the misalignment: upward or downward adjustment and exaptation. For
instance, we can consider as Ei, that, in the university, professors who publish in well-reputed inter-
national magazines are awarded better academic titles and, as a result, they are able to win contests
and advance in their career. I, Andrew, build my Es on these Ei, thus affecting my project of life. Yet,
my Ei are falsiﬁed: I participate in several contests, in which the winners are not the most qualiﬁed
ones. Once more, one can intervene on the emerging gap through three kinds of interventions. In a
ﬁrst possible reaction, my Es tries to adjust to Ei, namely Es ↓ Ei. I persuade myself that merit does not
matter and, therefore, I decide to look for a different job or to search for someone who can pull a few
strings in my favour. In my second reaction, I do not admit that a divergence exists between my Es
and the new Ei. Hence, I convince myself and others that I’m sure merit will prevail in the end. In this
case, Es ↑ Ei, namely Es tries to adjust to Ei. In the third and creative reactions (exaptation): Es Ei. For
example, I decide to use my strong academic curriculum–which did not sufﬁce to win a contest – to
found a private institute of consulting which allows me both to earn money and do good research.
Finally, in a fourth reaction, Es Ei, consists of radically redeﬁning my subjective expectations so that
these become completely independent of the institutional expectations.
The set of reactions (upward or downward adjustment and positive or negative exaptation) to the
gaps existing between a subjective and an institutional expectation represents an additional space of
the P-capabilities. In fact, our expectations about other people’s expectations are very important in
general; when these concern, not the individual, but promises and threats of an institution, they are
able to shape our potentialities.
At this point of our argument, the circuit is completed. If disability emerges as a limit and a stimulus
that leads to a creative transformation, then entitlements, A-capabilities and O-capabilities become
crucial. However, whatmainly affect the process of redeﬁnition ofwell being of a person facing serious
conditions of vulnerability are P-capabilities.
How can we operationalise this model? We will go deeper into this topic in coming essays of this
issue. In this paper, we will brieﬂy introduce it. Let us suppose a wide range of sources of information
15 While beliefs usually rest on theﬂeeting contours of an ideology, institutional expectations refer towell established customs
and to veriﬁable and veriﬁed reproductive rules: ceteris paribus, a person knows he/she can trust them. Since the origins
of modern social sciences, the very term “crisis” was introduced in reference, not to a generic discontinuity, but to speciﬁc
obstacles in the predicted functioning of an economic, political or cultural institution, i.e. when it can no longer honor its
commitments and, above all, the promises and aspirations it generated and spread.
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about disability is available to us. They are collected,within a given samepopulation, following several
criteria:
• presence of at least a functional limitation;
• restriction of the activity;
• self-attribution of a condition of disability;
• request for at least one type of assistance (equipment or beneﬁts from the state);
• request for a public acknowledgement of disability.
As Ravaud et al. (2002) highlight, we obtain different results depending on the speciﬁc criterion
that we use and, despite identifying a decreasing number of disabled people, when we move from
the ﬁrst to the ﬁfth criterion, they intersect in irregular and non-transitive ways, as shown by Fig. 2,
inspired by Wittgenstein.
At this point, it does not seem necessary to establish, among the ﬁve criteria, which one should be
selected. We assume that, adopting any one of them, we are able to identify a subset of population
qualiﬁed as disabled. It is at this very stage that a method based on the capability approach can
intervene. Such a method would require people’s informative and participatory contribution. Here,
we have given a simpliﬁed version of what this method could consist of. It is thus presented as an
informative procedure which requires the involvement of all stakeholders in a process of reﬂection
on their values, well-being dimensions and therefore, on their capabilities which Biggeri et al. (this
issue, next article) articulate in the instrumental process to accomplish the life project.
For the sake of simplicity, the central element of this procedure, which gets into a wider process of
evaluation, can be based on four questions:
I. “Which are the most important opportunities a person should have during his/her life?;16
II. “How important is each of the opportunities that you identiﬁed, in your life?”;
III. “How much importance do you think the institutions attach to the opportunities that you identi-
ﬁed?”;
IV. “To what extent do you think there is a correlation between the opportunities that social institu-
tions view as important and the opportunities you value for your own life?”.17
Question [I] asks the interviewee to answer in general terms, regardless of the concrete constraints
of his/her speciﬁc situation (capabilities generally aspired to). Based upon the previous answer, ques-
tion [II] encourages him/her to assess his/her own existence: the person is encouraged to assess
the relevance of the set of prospective opportunities (or, more precisely, of the potentialities) for
him/herself. Question [III] goes more in depth into the relationship between the person and the net-
work of institutions prevalent in the environment. The interviewee is not asked to provide an opinion
about a given institution’s performance, but about the degree to which these respect his/her needs.
Finally, question [IV] asks him/her to compare and evaluate the connection between the opportuni-
ties objectively provided and the ones subjectively expected, namely the interviewee is encouraged
to assess his/her evaluations. In short, based on the answers to this questionnaire, we are able to
obtain information about beliefs (question I), attitudes or systems of actions (question II), institu-
tional expectations (question III) and subjective or “second level” expectations (question IV). Thus, we
have focused on the four variables that form the analysis of the P-capabilitieswithin themodel TAOPE.
This procedure thus allows us to begin to investigate the expansion or reduction of the P-capabilities,
with the aim of reviewing and if required, giving new orientation to existing policy.
16 Please, note that questions are not addressed to the “disabled”, but to the “person”, coherently with what we have argued
above.
17 A formulation of these questions is at the core of the questionnaire drafted and applied in Biggeri et al. (2006) and Biggeri
and Libanora (2011).
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External capability and team-agency
Our aimhere is not to thoroughly scrutinise the critical argument according towhich the capability
approach would still be too individualistic, a comprehensive example of this critique can be found in
Stewart (2005; Trani et al., this issue). In line with Delbono and Lanzi (2007, p. 131–2, our translation),
we merely want to observe that it seems «necessary to extend the approach by formulating models
able to explain howgroups and individuals interact in order to create and destroy relevant capabilities.
In this way, [. . .], it will be possible to investigate the real power relations which characterise social
environmentswithinwhich resources and rights are converted into actual functionings». So far, several
authorshave stressed the importanceof a reﬂectionon theprimary focus that the capabilities approach
placed on the individual. Although number of critiques have brought forward arguments in favour of
looking more closely at collective aspects, it is essential to further pursue a speciﬁc aspect of collective
action, namely the formation of ‘external capabilities’ (above mentioned as E-capabilities). Foster and
Handy (2008, 4, our italics and translation) refer to “external capabilities” to describe cases in which a
person is able to achieve additional functionings through a direct connection with another person. We
do not share the authors’ choice of narrowing the scope of E-capabilities only to abilities and achieved
functioning. In our view, beyond the one of achieved functioning, external capabilities also incorporate
the meanings of opportunity, potentiality and, even more relevant, that of entitlement. According to
Foster and Handy (2008), who introduced this concept,18 E-capabilities emerge when, within a direct
interaction, Andrew gets an entitlement, an ability, an opportunity or a potentiality from the action
intentionally undertaken by Betty. For instance, let us imagine that Betty owns important information
for both Andrew and her and because of their friendship, she decides to share this information with
Andrew. Alternatively, let us suppose that, when shopping, Betty also buys something for Andrew,
who cannot go out. In another context, let us consider the case in which Betty’s mother teaches young
Andrewhow to take care of his hygiene. In all the cases analysed, Andrew’s entitlements or capabilities
derive from his relation with (the entitlement or the capability) Betty. The term “external capabilities”
has been used with a different meaning by Nussbaum (1998) to recognize the impossibility to use her
capabilities by the actions of other persons. However, Nussbaum herself comes back to the concept
changing it on “external conditions” i.e. social conversion factors (2000, note 94, p. 84–85).
While positive externalities, which are interdependencies which are not signaled by market prices,
usually do not entail or at least do not require a personal link between the individual producing them
and the one receiving them, E-capabilities are based on care, on a relation of proximity and/or mutual
support between two people. «Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like
faculty in another. I judge of your sight bymy sight, of your ear bymy ear, of your reason bymy reason,
of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other
way of judging about them» (Smith, 1759, p. 19).
However, it is important, to stress that E-capabilities cannot arise without a reciprocal intentional
sharing. Betty coordinates her action with Andrew’s in order to make accessible to him her own
resources, rights, ability or opportunity. Nevertheless, in turn, Andrew coordinates with Betty to make
use of her contribution, which he has the choice to refuse, and to confer on to it, a value of well-being.
This appears to be coherent with the deﬁnition of “disability” we put forward earlier, according to
which disability always implies a dimension of proactive adaptation.
In addition, and more importantly, acknowledging the mutual feature of the relation leads us to a
crucial theoretical point: the shift from the individual agent to a collective-agency. We deﬁne “agent”
as a person who acts, brings on some changes and results that can be judged according to his/her
objectives and values, regardless of the fact that we assess them on the basis of some external crite-
rion (Sen, 1999). It is possible that several agents, committing to voluntary coordination, manage to
conceive a collective action, characterised by the fact that individual well-being can be developed and
improved only through group-oriented behaviour. This occurs, for example, in symphony orchestras
or in sports teams, where better results are only be achieved if single members avoid maximising
18 However, the concept of “external capabilities” is not new: for example it has been discussed by Basu and Foster (1998)
and Biggeri et al. (2006).
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what is useful to them (“everyone behaves as a soloist, regardless of what happens to the group”), as
well as if they avoid being indistinctly altruist (“everyone tries to be generous towards his/her mates,
regardless of what happens to the group”). Indeed, the winning strategy requires that each member
is ready to follow the conductor or coach’s instructions. In such situations, the interdependence of
actions is so strong that results are indivisible goods, whose value tends to cancel out as soon as the
contribution of any member, even the most vulnerable one, is removed. The literature concerning
the technologies of aggregation of public goods supply deﬁnes such a circumstance as “the weakest
link”: only the smallest among different contributions determines the level of public goods at the
entire group’s disposal (Sandler, 2004, chap. 3). For instance, if we consider a contagious disease, we
will observe that its containment depends on the less committed nation. Consequently, the strongest
countries are encouraged to collaborate with the weakest ones.
« Economic models of team agency (Sugden, 2003; Bacharach, 2006) rest upon the idea that, when
an individual reasons as a teammember, he stops considering theactionswhichproduce thebest result
tohimandstart focusingon those combinationsof actions, undertakenbyall teammembers,whichare
able to promote the objectives of the team. In particular, the subject will try to understand which role
he/she can playwithin the teamaction plan. In this case, individual actionswill be judged as rational, if
they ﬁt within a collective rational behaviour » (Pelligra, 2007, 142, our translation). Assuming that all
other members of the team follow the same criterion, the agent chooses the option that, in spite of not
always optimising his/her individual position, represents the optimum if taken in conjunction with
the options chosen by the others within the team. Therefore, team-agency presumes an extremely
demanding relationship, based on trust. The archetypal situation in which this mechanism takes place
is the relationship mother-child. When a woman decides to become a mother, she knows that her
life is going to change radically. She will have to give birth to the baby, transfer entitlements and
enhance capabilities for him/her, lead him/her to adulthood and to his/her full social autonomy. The
most rewarding process is the one inwhich the child, progressively acquiring his/her agency, interacts
with the mother, rewarding the care he/she receives with his/her attention. If this is the case, then
the mother’s aim to develop her child’s agency, namely to act in terms of a team agency. Indeed, the
quality of the mother’s life depends, not only on fully expressing her agency, but also on succeeding
in enhancing, at the same time, her and her child’s agency. The common sense is so permeated by this
intuition that it does not even distinguish between the mother’s interests and the one of the team
mother-child. In fact, it directly assumes that the best way to “be a mother” consists in fostering the
child’s agency, develop his/her E-capabilities.
But what happens to team agency when it faces conditions that are less favourable compared to
the mother-child relationship? If E-capabilities are based on team agency, and if they play a crucial
role in any person’s well-being, what happens in groups that are extensive and in which members are
anonymous? As long as a mother takes care of her sick or disabled child, we can rely on the “team
spirit”; however, what occurs in cases where this intuitive affection and care is absent?
Cognitive neuroscience explains that, when there are no individual reasons to adopt a “team spirit”,
evolutive relations of inclusive ﬁtness or kin selection might carry out a similar function. They lead
us to an out-and-out ranking of the care (of the taking care), brilliantly presented by Pinker (1997).
According to the author, the essence of love consists of feeling pleasure deriving contentment from
someoneelse’swell-being and sorrow fromhis/her suffering. Such feelings justify actions on thebehalf
of the other person, i.e. taking care of him/her, feeding him/her, protecting him/her. We can therefore
understand why many animals, human beings included, love their children, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, siblings, uncles and cousins: people who beneﬁt their blood relatives, are equivalent
to geneswhich beneﬁt themselves. Sacriﬁcesmade for love are proportionate to the degree of kinship:
we make more sacriﬁces for our children than for our grandchildren. Sacriﬁces are also proportioned
to the expectation of reproductive life of the beneﬁciary: parents sacriﬁce themselves more than their
children because the latter have a longer life ahead of them. Finally, sacriﬁces are proportionate to the
beneﬁciary’s feelings of love. We love our grandmother not because we expect her to reproduce, but
because our grandmother loves us and the rest of our family. In other words, we beneﬁt people who
feel pleasure at beneﬁting us and our blood relatives. To sum up in a slightly impertinent way: if the
disabled person is a young son/daughter, parents will lovingly take care of him/her; if the disabled
person is an uncle or a grandfather, his relatives will take care of him with moderate benevolence; if,













Fig. 6. Relations between entitlements and capabilities.
Authors’ elaboration.
ﬁnally, the person is an elder without blood relatives, living in a fragmented and anonymous society,
nobody will take care of him/her. This conclusion, far from being unlikely, is very distressing. It shows
that, also among persons with disabilities, there are the “penultimate” and the “last” ones; the former
are fostered to their relatives or to small, integrated group, while we do not know what to do or what
to propose about the latter.
In such circumstances, a ﬁrst possible way of answering this consists in focusing on human obli-
gations (Nussbaum, 2006). As Sen has observed (2009), capability is a kind of power and it would be a
mistake to consider it as a mere concept of human advantage, neglecting one of its central concepts:
human obligation. This focus on obligations can only be possible in a social context with very speciﬁc
features, namely high quality of interpersonal relations as well as an ethical commitment to support
and orient policy interventions.
Another plausible answer attempts to identify behaviours and pathways that can empower the
group to ground its action and expand collective agency, transforming the E-capabilities into C-
capabilities (collective capabilities). We brieﬂy address the question of collective capabilities in
another paper (Bellanca and Biggeri, 2010).
We conclude this paper by summarising the relations existing between Entitlements, A-
capabilities, O-capabilities, P-capabilities and E-capabilities in Fig. 6.
External or E-capability inﬂuences A-capability and T-Entitlement. These inﬂuence O-capability
and P-capability, which circularly inﬂuences A-capability. In turn, the circuit inﬂuences new entitle-
ments T and E-capabilities.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a framework of “dis-capability” based on, and extension of, the capability
approach of Amartya Sen to analyse the concept of disability in a dynamic context.
According to this framework, we deﬁne as disabled someone who has a limited capability set
compared to his/her objectives, ambitions and system of values. This self-representation is derived
from a process of social acknowledgement, which also includes medical assessments.
However, as a result of the process, it is possible to identify a disability only through individual eval-
uations and therefore, political interventions aimed at improving such situations need to be tailored
to a person’s requirements (Biggeri et al., this issue). Living a decent life for a person with disabili-
ties does not mean conforming to normality; it involves an expansion of the opportunities open to a
person.
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